Publications:
[1] Sequential learning under informational ambiguity, 2026, American Economic Review [Link] [SSRN]
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Abstract: This paper studies informational robustness in social learning, where individuals face ambiguity and consider a set of possible data-generating processes. I show that, under sufficient ambiguity, an information cascade occurs almost surely, regardless of the underlying DGP.
Supplementary Materials: published version, extended version [SSRN] |
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Abstract: This paper introduces a biased updating rule under ambiguity. Individuals consider a set of DGPs and update beliefs using those that can best justify their endowed biases. I characterize the resulting learning dynamics and show that biased updating can lead to persistent mislearning and belief polarization.
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Working papers:
[1] The wisdom of crowds or group irrationality? Non-Bayesian social learning with misspecification, December 2025.
Revised & Resubmitted @ American Economic Journal: Microeconomics [SSRN]
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Abstract: This paper introduces group irrationality: situations in which society fails to learn the truth even though each individual could do so in isolation. I show that group irrationality is prevalent under non-Bayesian social learning rules, but can be avoided when learning rules are insensitive to extreme beliefs or when individuals sufficiently underreact to information.
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Co-author: Yuyi Li (UNC, PhD student)
Abstract: This paper introduces an unlearning algorithm for social learning, in which society gradually reduces the weight on public information. We show that, if this weight decays at a sub-reciprocal rate, a correct information cascade emerges almost surely in the long run. |
[3] If you are NOT so smart, why are you rich? Robust market selection with general recursive preferences, March 2024. [SSRN]
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Co-author: Pablo Beker (University of Warwick)
Abstract: This paper introduces a unified framework of market selection with general recursive preferences. We characterize long-run consumption dynamics and show that the market selection hypothesis is no longer robust in general. In particular, consumers with incorrect beliefs can survive against a large class of preferences and beliefs. What does the graph mean?
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